A Fistful of Dollars? Foreign Sales Platforms and Profit Shifting in Tax Havens
Sébastien Laffitte  1, 2@  , Farid Toubal  1, 2, 3@  
1 : Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay  (ENS Paris Saclay)
ENS Paris-Saclay
61 av du Pdt Wilson94230 Cachan -  France
2 : Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique  (CREST)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR9194
5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier91120 Palaiseau -  France
3 : Centre d\'études prospectives et dínformations internationales  (CEPII)
Centre d\'études prospectives et d\'informations internationales, Centre d\'études prospectives et d\'informations internationales, Centre d\'études prospectives et d\'informations internationales, Centre d\'études prospectives et d\'informations internationales, Centre d\'études prospectives et d\'informations internationales, Centre d\'études prospectives et d\'informations internationales, Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales

Using public macro-level data on activities of multinationals, we document that U.S. firms geographically disconnect sales and production to avoid paying corporate taxes. We revisit both theoretically and empirically the location determinants of foreign platforms and show that market access motives are far less relevant when considering tax havens. We characterize these countries and shed light on the attractiveness of different tax havens for specific sectors of activity. Our quantification shows that profit shifting by foreign sales platforms in tax havens amounts to about \$80bn in 2013. Our findings contribute to the recent policy debate on the reform of international taxation.


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