We examine the effects of the postulated metric on the measurement of well-being, by comparing, in the (income, lifetime) space, two indexes: the equivalent income index and the equivalent lifetime index. Those two indexes respect, in some sense, individual preferences, but these rely on two incompatible ethical views on interpersonal comparisons of well-being, which lead to distinct metrics: resourcism and lifetimism. While those incompatibilities arise under distinct indifference maps, we then explore the effects of the metric while relying on a unique indifference map. We illustrate those effects by quantifying, by those two indexes, the (average) well-being loss due to the Syrian War. Assuming resourcism or lifetimism leads, from a quantitative perspective, to different pictures of the deprivation due to the War. This suggests that the metric matters for well-being measurement, even when relying on a unique indifference map.