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How is environmental policy affected by political economy forces? Despite renewed interest in the role of environmental regulation in the energy transition, this question remains largely unanswered. This paper develops an analysis of electoral accountability and influence in policy formation. Specifically, I use a comprehensive dataset on environmentally related votes in the US Senate for 1971-2013 to assess the impact both of electoral incentives and industry contributions on the voting behavior of senators, making use of the staggered structure of senators' elections for identification.
I find that the re-election incentive reduces a senator's probability to vote against environmental regulation by between 2% and 3.5%, and this effect is larger the larger environmental support in their state is. Furthermore, the results indicate this effect is driven by republican senators trying to capture pro-environmental vote. Finally, contrary to findings in previous literature, past contributions seem to have a significant impact on voting behavior only toward the end of senators' terms, suggesting pro-industry voting is used to attract more funding but not to reward past contributions. The results have important implications for the political feasibility of environmental regulation.
